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Consciousness, Neurobiology of
After a hiatus of fifty years or more, the physical origins of
CONSCIOUSNESS are being once again vigorously debated, in
hundreds of books and monographs published in the last
decade. What sparse facts can we ascertain about the neuro-
biological basis of consciousness, and what can we reason-
ably assume at this point in time?
By and large, neuroscientists have made a number of
working assumptions that need to be justified more fully, in
particular, 
1. There is something to be explained, that is, the subjec-
tive content associated with a conscious sensation (what
philosophers refer to as QUALIA; see also WHAT-IT’S-LIKE)
does exist and has its physical basis in the brain. 
2. Consciousness is one of the principal properties of the
human brain, a highly evolved system; it must therefore
have a useful function to perform. Crick and Koch (1995)
assume that the function of visual consciousness is to pro-
duce the best current interpretation of the visual scene—in
the light of past experiences—and to make it available for a
sufficient time to the parts of the brain that contemplate,
plan, and execute voluntary motor outputs (including lan-
guage). This needs to be contrasted with the on-line systems
that bypass consciousness but can generate stereotyped
behaviors (see below). 
3. At least some animal species (i.e., non-human primates
such as the macaque monkey) are assumed to possess some
aspects of consciousness. Consciousness associated with
sensory events is likely to be very similar in humans and
monkeys for several reasons. First, trained monkeys behave
as humans do under controlled conditions for most sensory
tasks (e.g., visual motion discrimination; see MOTION, PER-
CEPTION OF; Wandell 1995). Second, the gross neuroanat-
omy of humans and nonhuman primates is the same, once
the difference in size has been accounted for. Finally, MAG-
NETIC RESONANCE IMAGING in humans is confirming the
existence of a funtional organization very similar to that dis-
covered by single-cell electrophysiology in the monkey
(Tootell et al. 1996). As a corollary, it follows that language
is not necessary for consciousness to occur (although it
greatly enriches human consciousness). In the following, we
will mainly concentrate on sensory consciousness, and, in
particular, on visual consciousness, because it is experimen-
tally the most accessible and the best understood.
Cognitive and clinical research demonstrates that much
complex information processing can occur without involv-
ing consciousness, both in normals as well as in patients.
Examples of this include BLINDSIGHT (Weiskrantz 1997),
priming, and the implicit recognition of complex sequences
(Velmans 1991; Berns, Cohen, and Mintun 1997). Milner
and Goodale (1995) have made a masterful case for the
existence of so-called on-line visual systems that bypass
consciousness, and that serve to mediate relative stereotype
visual-motor behaviors, such as eye and arm movements as
well as posture adjustments, in a very rapid manner. On-line
systems work in egocentric coordinate systems and lack
both certain types of perceptual ILLUSIONS (e.g. size illu-
sion) and direct access to WORKING MEMORY. Milner and
Goodale (1995; see also Rossetti forthcoming) hypothesize
that on-line systems are associated with the dorsal stream of
visual information in the CEREBRAL CORTEX, originating in
the primary VISUAL CORTEX (V1) and terminating in the
posterior parietal cortex (see VISUAL PROCESSING
STREAMS). This contrasts well with the function of con-
sciousness alluded to above, namely, to synthesize informa-
tion from many different sources and use it to plan
behavioral patterns over time.
What is the neuronal correlate of consciousness? Most
popular has been the belief that consciousness arises as an
emergent property of a very large collection of interacting
neurons (Popper and Eccles 1981; Libet 1995). An alterna-
tive hypothesis is that there are special sets of “conscious-
ness” neurons distributed throughout cortex (and associated
systems, such as the THALAMUS and the BASAL GANGLIA)
that represent the ultimate neuronal correlate of conscious-
ness (NCC), in the sense that activity of an appropriate sub-
set of them is both necessary and sufficient to give rise to an
appropriate conscious experience or percept (Crick and
Koch 1995). NCC neurons would, most likely, be character-
ized by a unique combination of molecular, biophysical,
pharmacological, and anatomical traits. It is also possible,
of course, that all cortical neurons may be capable of partic-
ipating in the representation of one percept or another,
though not necessarily doing so for all percepts. The secret
of consciousness would then consist of all cortical neurons
representing that particular percept at that moment (see
BINDING BY NEURONAL SYNCHRONY).
Where could such NCC neurons be found? Based on
clinical evidence that small lesions of the intralaminar
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nuclei of the thalamus (ILN) cause loss of consciousness
and coma and that ILN neurons project widely and recipro-
cally into the cerebral cortex, ILN neurons have been pro-
posed as the site where consciousness is generated (Bogen
1995; Purpura and Schiff 1997). It is more likely, however,
that ILN neurons provide an enabling or arousal signal with-
out which no significant cortical processing can occur. The
great specificity associated with the content of our con-
sciousness at any point in time could only be mediated by
neurons in the cerebral cortex, its associated specific tha-
lamic nuclei, and the basal ganglia. It is here, among the
neurons whose very specific response properties have been
extensively characterized by SINGLE-NEURON RECORDING,
that we have to look for the NCC.
What, if anything, can we infer about the location of
these neurons? In the case of visual consciousness, Crick
and Koch (1995) surmised that these neurons must have
access to visual information and project to the planning
stages of the brain, that is, to premotor and frontal areas
(Fuster 1997). Because in the macaque monkey, no neu-
rons in primary visual cortex project to any area anterior
to the central sulcus, Crick and Koch (1995) proposed that
neurons in V1 do not directly give rise to consciousness
(although V1 is necessary for most forms of vision, just as
the retina is). Current electrophysiological, psychophysi-
cal, and imaging evidence (He, Cavanagh, and Intriligator
1996; Engel, Zhang, and Wandell 1997) supports the
hypothesis that the NCC is not to be found among V1
neurons.
A promising experimental approach to locate the NCC
has been the use of bistable percepts, that is, pairs of per-
cepts, alternating in time, that arise from a constant visual
stimulus as in a Necker cube (Crick and Koch 1992). In one
such case, a small image, say of a horizontal grating, is pre-
sented to the left eye and another image, say of a vertical
grating, is presented to the corresponding location in the
right eye. In spite of the constant retinal stimulus, observers
“see” the horizontal grating alternate every few seconds
with the vertical one, a phenomenon known as “binocular
rivalry” (Blake 1989). The brain does not allow for the
simultaneous perception of both images.
It is possible, though difficult, to train a macaque mon-
key to report whether it is currently seeing the left or the
right image. The distribution of the switching times and the
way in which changing the contrast in one eye affects these
times leaves little doubt that monkeys and humans experi-
ence the same basic phenomenon (Myerson, Miezin, and
Allman 1981). In a series of elegant experiments, Logothe-
tis and colleagues (Logothetis and Schall 1989; Leopold
and Logothetis 1996; Sheinberg and Logothetis 1997)
recorded from a variety of monkey cortical areas during this
task. In early visual cortex, only a small fraction of cells
modulated their response as a function of the percept of the
monkey, while 20 to 30 percent of neurons in MT and V4
cells did. The majority of cells increased their firing rate in
response to one or the other retinal stimulus with no regard
to what the animal perceived at the time. In contrast, in a
high-level cortical area, such as the inferior temporal cortex
(IT), almost all neurons responded only to the perceptual
dominant stimulus (in other words, a “face” cell only fired
when the animal indicated by its performance that it saw the
face and not the sunburst pattern in the other eye). This
makes it likely that the NCC is located among—or be-
yond—IT neurons.
Finding the NCC would only be the first, albeit critical,
step in understanding consciousness. We also need to know
where these cells project to, their postsynaptic action, and
what happens to them in various diseases known to affect
consciousness, such as schizophrenia or AUTISM, and so on.
And, of course, a final theory of consciousness would have
to explain the central mystery—why a physical system with
a particular architecture gives rise to feelings and qualia.
(Chalmers 1996).
See also ATTENTION; ATTENTION IN THE ANIMAL BRAIN;
ATTENTION AND THE HUMAN BRAIN; SENSATIONS
—Christof Koch and Francis Crick
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Constraint Satisfaction
A constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) defined over a con-
straint network consists of a finite set of variables, each
associated with a domain of values, and a set of constraints.
A solution is an assignment of a value to each variable from
its domain such that all the constraints are satisfied. Typical
constraint satisfaction problems are to determine whether a
solution exists, to find one or all solutions, and to find an
optimal solution relative to a given cost function. A well-
known example of a constraint satisfaction problem is k-col-
orability, where the task is to color, if possible, a given graph
with k colors only, such that any two adjacent nodes have dif-
ferent colors. A constraint satisfaction formulation of this
problem associates the nodes of the graph with variables, the
possible colors are their domains, and the inequality con-
straints between adjacent nodes are the constraints of the
problem. Each constraint of a CSP may be expressed as a
relation, defined on some subset of variables, the legal com-
binations of whose values are noted. Constraints can also be
described by mathematical expressions or by computable
procedures. Another typical constraint satisfaction problem
is SATisfiability, the task of finding the truth assignment to
propositional variables such that a given set of clauses is sat-
isfied. For example, given the two clauses (A V B V Ø C), (Ø
A V D), the assignment of false to A, true to B, false to C,
and false to D, is a satisfying truth value assignment.
The structure of a constraint network is depicted by a
constraint graph whose nodes represent the variables and in
which any two nodes are connected if the corresponding
variables participate in the same constraint. In the k-col-
orability formulation, the graph to be colored is the con-
straint graph. In our SAT example the constraint graph has A
connected to D, and A, B, and C are connected to each other.
Constraint networks have proven successful in modeling
mundane cognitive tasks such as vision, language compre-
hension, default reasoning, and abduction, as well as in
applications such as scheduling, design, diagnosis, and tem-
poral and spatial reasoning. In general, constraint satisfac-
tion tasks are computationally intractable (“NP-hard”; see
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY).
ALGORITHMS for processing constraints can be classified
into two interacting categories: (1) search and (2) consis-
tency inference. Search algorithms traverse the space of par-
tial instantiations, while consistency inference algorithms
reason through equivalent problems. Search algorithms are
either systematic and complete or stochastic and incom-
plete. Likewise, consistency inference algorithms have
either complete solutions (e.g., variable-elimination algo-
rithms) or incomplete solutions (i.e., local consistency algo-
rithms).
Local consistency algorithms, also called “consistency-
enforcing” or “constraint propagation” algorithms (Mon-
tanari 1974; Mackworth 1977; Freuder 1982), are polyno-
mial algorithms that transform a given constraint network
into an equivalent, yet more explicit network by deducing
new constraints to be added onto the network. Intuitively, a
consistency-enforcing algorithm will make any partial solu-
tion of a small subnetwork extensible to some surrounding
network. For example, the most basic consistency algo-
rithm, called an “arc consistency” algorithm, ensures that
any legal value in the domain of a single variable has a legal
match in the domain of any other selected variable. A “path
consistency” algorithm ensures that any consistent solution
to a two-variable subnetwork is extensible to any third vari-
able, and, in general, i-consistency algorithms guarantee
that any locally consistent instantiation of i – 1 variables is
extensible to any ith variable. Enforcing i-consistency is
time and space exponential in i. Algorithms for i-consis-
tency frequently decide inconsistency.
A network is globally consistent if it is i-consistent for
every i, which means a solution can be assembled by assign-
ing values using any variable ordering without encountering
any dead end, namely, in a “backtrack-free” manner. How-
ever, it is enough to possess directional global consistency
relative to a given ordering only. Indeed, an adaptive consis-
tency (variable elimination) algorithm enforces global con-
sistency in a given order only, such that every solution can
be extracted, with no dead ends along this ordering. Another
related algorithm, called a “tree-clustering” algorithm, com-
piles the given constraint problem into an equivalent tree of
subproblems (Dechter and Pearl 1989) whose respective
solutions can be efficiently combined into a complete solu-
tion. Adaptive consistency and tree-clustering algorithms
are time and space exponential in a parameter of the con-
straint graph called an “induced-width” or “tree-width”
parameter (Arnborg and Proskourowski 1989; Dechter and
Pearl 1987).
When a problem is computationally hard for an adaptive
consistency algorithm, it can be solved by bounding the
amount of consistency enforcing (e.g., arc or path consis-
tency), and by augmenting the algorithm with a search com-
ponent. Generally speaking, search will benefit from
network representations that have a high level of consistency.
However, because the complexity of enforcing i-consistency
is exponential in i, there is a trade-off between the effort
spent on consistency inference and that spent on search. The-
oretical and empirical studies of this trade-off, prior to or
during search, aim at identifying a problem-dependent cost-
effective balance (Haralick and Elliot 1980; Prosser 1993;
Sabin and Freuder 1994; Dechter and Rish 1994).
The most common algorithm for performing systematic
search is the backtracking algorithm, which traverses the
